The aim of this paper is to identify bubbles in oil prices by using the "exponential fitting" methodology proposed by Watanabe et al. [28, 29] . We use the daily US dollar closing crude oil prices of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) covering the
I. Introduction
The crude oil price determination was subject to a radical change with the establishment of the West Texas Intermediate (hereafter, WTI) -Cushing, Oklahoma and of the Brent -Europe oil markets. They aimed to break the monopolistic power of OPEC and to switch to a more "fair" price regime. Since then, non-commercial traders became a significant market participant affecting oil prices with their commercial counterparts, such as oil companies and refineries etc. After the 2000s, increasing numbers of financial investors, started to invest in commodity, especially crude oil, futures markets. Therefore, (future) trade of crude oil became a transaction beyond the actual demand-supply interaction. Coincidentally, there were severe and persistent increases in crude oil price during the same period. Some argued that the price surges are speculative bubbles 1 caused by the financialization of the crude oil market.
2,3
The speculation argument was not made without a foundation; because the deviation between world oil consumption and production has never exceeded ±2 percent since 1980. In addition, the known oil reserves increased 2.3 times from 642 billion barrels to about 1.4 trillion barrels in the same period. Hence, in terms of oil-specific economic fundamentals, there were no bases for the sharp surges in oil prices.
The academia, however, by and large, took an opposite position. They argued that the huge financial inflows into the long-only commodity index funds 1 A bubble is simply over-pricing by the market, causing the market price deviate from the asset"s intrinsic value (see also Scherbina [13] ). In our technical analysis, based on the exponential growth curve, we define a bubble as an exponential increase in the price with growth parameter greater than 1. 2 The literature credits Masters [1] , who was a manager of a private financial fund, with this argumentation. It was based on the one-to-one movement between the number of index-fund future contracts invested and the price of crude oil, especially after 2003 (see for example, figure 1 in Alquist and Gervais [2] . Ripple [3] criticizes this view, arguing that open interest in the 30-day futures contract is just a fraction of actual oil consumption when expressed as barrels per day. Irwin and Sanders [4] argue that Masters [1] is making the statistical mistake of confusing correlation with causation. Sanders and Irwin [5] also show that index position estimates generated by the Masters algorithm may contain potential inaccuracies. 3 There were also drops in oil prices following the price surges. However, they were frequently downward sticky and shorter, and rarely very sharp. In other words, price rises and falls were uneven in the sense that the former was more persistent and sharper while the latter was shorter and hardly reaching back before-rise levels. We therefore focus on bubbles.
3 in majority cannot be the source of price surges in crude oil price, and that it is not correct to attribute these price increases to the financial speculation. 4 Though researchers took varying positions against the idea of "bubbles in the crude oil price", they almost unanimously agreed that the speculation was not the cause. 5 First, some of these studies raised oil-specific and non-oil specific economic fundamentals for explaining the price surges. These ranged from increasing demand from emerging and developing countries (e.g., China and India) to adverse oil supply shocks. For example, Hamilton [6] argued that a low price elasticity of oil demand and the failure of physical production to increase are the primary causes of the oil shock of 2007-08. Kilian [7] shows evidence that oil price surges have been driven mainly by a combination of global aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks in the post-1975
period. The cumulative effects of positive global demand shocks after 2003 have also been effective. Similarly, Kilian and Hicks [8] and Kilian and Murphy [9] conjecture that increase in oil prices during the 2003-2008 was not due to supply shortfall or speculative demand but due to unexpected growth in emerging economies and global business cycle. 6 Elder et al. [10] studied the role of economic news on jumps in crude oil prices by using intra-daily data. They find a strong correspondence between high frequency jumps in oil prices and the arrival of new economic information. periods by a political and/or macroeconomic event. However, one should note that these explanations are not based on any objective measure, as the method extracts bubble periods from the data itself. Given that we can explain each of these periods by a political and/or macroeconomic event, we believe that these bubbles are not result of speculative acts but they are due to non-oil economic or political events. Such events led to distortion of relative prices to the advantage of several commodity prices, including crude oil.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the methodology. Section 3 evaluates the data and the empirical findings. The final section concludes the paper.
Methodology
Watanabe et al. [28, 29] introduced the following formula for extracting the exponential behavior:
In equation (1) To apply equation (1), the optimal observation period i T must be fixed. The following AR equation is used to estimate it:
In equation (2), j a and () ft are tuned in such a way that equation (2) fits the actual data with minimum error.
The following steps are followed in exponential fitting method of Watanabe et al. [28, 29] 
Finally, to check the validity of such exponential trend approximation, it is compared with a linear trend approximation for a given period by the least square method to minimize the error:
In equation (4),
 
avg  represents average. 11 The rolling estimation of the parameter w 1 (i;T i ) does not assume any parameter stability. This approach, given the optimal observation window, tracks the changes in w
Data and Empirical Results
In this paper, we use the daily US Descriptive statistics for both WTI and Brent crude oil prices are given in Table 1 . Estimates of the skewness and kurtosis parameters show that both series are right skewed and more peaked compared to the normal distribution. 10 The Jarque-Bera (JB) test also rejects the normal distribution for both series.
Therefore, both series are fat tailed and probability of extreme (particularly positive extreme) values is higher compared to the normal distribution. The autoregressive conditional hetroskedasticity (ARCH) tests indicate strong ARCH effect in both series, implying volatility persistence and clustering. In Watanabe et al. [28] and [29] , this estimate is assigned to date of observation 400 in Figures 1(a) and 2(a). However, the exponential behavior identification based on P trend (t) starts at observation 1 and covers the whole sample period. 14 See, for example, Hamilton [6] and Kilian [7] , having the same argument. 15 One must note that Kilian [7] made a very clear distinction between the effects of physical disruptions on oil supply and the rise in precautionary demand due to political events that rise uncertainty in oil supply. 16 The crisis began in July 1997 and gripped much of East Asia. It started with the currency crisis and subsequent financial collapse of Thailand. It spread in time to many East Asian The fourth bubble arose almost immediately after the end of the third one, again driven by global aggregate demand, but perhaps with different dynamics.
In order to differentiate the fourth bubble from the third one, we first need to recall what did happen in the US housing market, which indeed ended the third bubble. In the US, the home prices started to fall after a period of bubble, which peaked in mid-2006. The fall inaugurated a vicious cycle: lenders increased (adjustable) mortgage rates and made it difficult to renew loans, which accelerated failures and further falls in the home prices. This caused a lost in countries, including Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines. Most of Southeast Asia and Japan experienced devaluing currency, falling stock and other asset prices, and a rise in private debt. Only by 1999, the Asian economies started to begin to recover. 17 It is very instructive to examine Figures 2 and 4 in Kilian [7] , showing the role of oil-specific demand shock in the period. 18 See, for example, Kilian [7] , Buyuksahin et al. [30] , Alquist and Kilian [31] and Fattouh [32] , having the same argument. Hamilton [6] , on the other hand, argues that the reason behind the rise in the 2000s has been the strong growth in global demand and failure of production to accompany that demand, especially between 2005-2007 that he labels as "stagnation in global production".
14 value of mortgage-backed derivatives due to high leverages, which led to a drastic fall in the appetite of global investors and the trust to the U.S. credit and financial markets. The US and the world economy were at the risk of a longlasting recession. The Fed responded to this risk in a very radical way by shifting to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. This led to an unprecedented increase in liquidity and very low real interest rates both in the US and across the globe, resulting in very cheap dollar in the world. We believe that the source of high global aggregate demand was high liquidity, low interest rates and cheap dollar. They caused huge financial inflows to many (storable) commodity markets, including the crude oil market, and triggered the bubble.
See, for example, Frankel and Rose [33] . Other studies, like Alquist and Gervais Table 3 gives the estimates of the exponential trend approximation error along with the error of the usual linear trend approximation for the bubble nonbubble periods.
The error estimates in Table 3 show that exponential approximation has much lower error than the linear approximation in all periods. In the bubble periods, the error of the exponential approximation relative to the linear approximation varies between 12% to 22% for both the WTI and Brent series.
In the non-bubble periods, the error of the nonlinear approximation relative to 15 the linear approximation is higher and varies between 25% to 63% for the WTI series and 24% to 63% for the Brent series. Overall, the results in Table 3 shows that exponential approximation has superior fit. 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
In this study, we apply the exponential fitting methodology, proposed by Watanabe et al. [28, 29] , on daily oil prices in order to identify bubbles and crashes in crude oil prices since 1986. The distinguishing feature of this study from the previous studies is that this paper is the first of its kind, showing the existence of bubbles in crude oil prices in the literature. We found four periods of bubbles since then. Our analyses showed that WTI prices, which is closely The establishment of futures markets in crude oil market was useful for an efficient determination of crude oil prices. It is actually this increase in efficiency that oil prices respond rapidly to economic or political news which appears consistent with economic theory (Elder et al., [10] ). Our analysis showed that the crude oil price data itself suggests the existence of bubbles. We, nonetheless, consider the surges in oil prices as a reflection of the efficiency of the market to all kinds of information rather than speculation. The so-called financialization process, that is, the interest of non-commercial investors to crude oil market, signals that the price of crude oil is no longer determined solely by its supply and demand but instead by the risk appetite and that the investment behavior of commodity index investors has become important.
Therefore, further research in this direction would be useful in order to explain the fundamentals of oil price determination.
Our study shows that there are bubbles and crashes in crude oil prices, triggered by various reasons. On surface, it may be a political, military, financial, or economic shock. At its roots, the causes of bubbles (and crashes) in crude oil price are twofold. First, all types of economic activities are overdependent on crude oil as an energy source. Second, crude oil is subject to 17 depletion. These two causes make the crude oil market very sensitive to any kind of information; the investors in crude oil futures market are ready to use any kind of information to make profit. The implication of bubbles and crashes is the welfare loss caused by distorted relative prices and economic instability:
(severe) fluctuations in employment, real wages, price level, and etc. Hence, the obvious policy suggestion implied by this paper is to reduce the oversensitiveness of crude oil futures market to information. One strategy to make this happen is to support, even to subsidize, the development of substitutes of crude oil, especially renewable energy resources, in order to reduce price bubbles and crashes and to sustain a stable economic activity. The total social welfare gain by reducing price bubbles and economic instability may be higher than the cost of subsidizing more expensive yet promising to have more stable prices.
